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Estimating the Firm’s Labor Supply Curve in a “New 
Monopsony” Framework: School Teachers in Missouri
*
 
In the context of certain dynamic models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to 
the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage. Using this property, we 
estimate the average labor supply elasticity to public school districts in Missouri. We take 
advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation in pre-negotiated district salary schedules to 
instrument for actual salary. Instrumental variables estimates lead to a labor supply elasticity 
estimate of about 3.7, suggesting the presence of significant market power for school 
districts, especially over more experienced teachers. The presence of monopsony power in 
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I. Introduction 
 
  There have been few attempts to estimate the labor supply elasticity to individual firms.  
In their survey of monopsony in the labor market, Boal and Ransom (1997) discussed only four 
studies that examine the question.  Manning’s (2003) recent book mentions another three, more 
recent papers.  This dearth of research is somewhat surprising, as the elasticity of the labor 
supply curve has important implications for labor market policies, such as the minimum wage. 
  Though this small pool of research partly reflects the technical difficulty of estimating the 
firm’s labor supply curve (due in part to a lack of convincing natural experiments or instruments 
to solve the inherent endogeneity problem) a more likely explanation may lie in the skepticism 
about the Robinsonian model of single-firm monopsony (Robinson, 1969), which was thought to 
be of limited empirical relevance.  However, recent theoretical models of the labor market 
suggest that individual firms may face upward sloping labor supply curves even in markets with 
many competing firms.  For example, Bhaskar and To (1999) propose a model of monopsonistic 
competition.  In a much different approach, Manning (2003) develops the implications of a 
search model that also yields upward sloping labor supply curves to firm, even when there are 
many firms in the labor market. 
  We posit a dynamic model of labor market monopsony.  In a model of the sort that 
Manning proposes, the elasticity of labor supply to the firm can be described in terms of the 
elasticity of quits to the wage, providing a very convenient way to estimate the firm’s labor 
supply elasticity.   We adopt this approach to examine the labor supply elasticity for a well 
defined skilled labor force, teachers in Missouri school districts during the 1980s.   
This is a promising setting in which to examine labor supply to the firm.  First, it is clear 
the work teachers do is very similar across districts within a single state, as the state sets the   4
curriculum and certifies teacher skill level.  Also, the labor market for school teachers has been 
suggested often as a likely place to observe monopsony power.  (See Beck, 1993, for an example 
and a survey of the literature). Furthermore, the widespread public collection of education data 
means we can control for a variety of pertinent worker and workplace characteristics. Finally, we 
have salary schedule data for many Missouri districts that allow us to construct instruments to 
correct for measurement error in salaries, the potential confounding effects of unobserved 
teacher characteristics, or other sources of endogeneity.  In our analysis, we estimate much larger 
elasticities when we control for these sources of endogeneity.  Such endogeneity may explain 
why Manning (2003, Chapter 4) estimates such small labor supply elasticities in his analysis of 
large panel data sets, for which this sort of instrument is not available.   
Our estimates indicate that school districts in Missouri have a large degree of monopsony 
power with supply elasticities around 3.7. We discuss institutional features of the teacher labor 
market in Missouri that may affect market power for school districts.  
 
II. Dynamic Monopsony and Labor Supply to the Firm 
  At least two recent approaches to modeling the labor market suggest mechanisms by 
which relatively small employers may wield monopsony power. Bhaskar and To (1999) develop 
a model of monopsonistic competition in which workers have heterogeneous preferences over 
some non-wage characteristic of potential jobs. In their particular example this preference is over 
a measure of distance to the job (closer is better).  Since the distance characteristic is 
predetermined for the potential job offers, workers facing equal wage offers accept the closer 
offer. Thus each employer has some market power to lower the wage without losing all 
employees.  Similarly, to increase firm size beyond the set of employees who live nearby, the   5
firm will have to offer a higher wage. Another model of monopsony power that also incorporates 
the idea of distance is presented by Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (2008), who posit that hospitals 
face more intense competition for nurses from their nearest neighbors than other hospitals in the 
area.  Boyd et. al. (2005) find that teachers are much more likely to end up in a job located close 
to the high school they attended, a fact they link to strong locational preference, a finding that 
lends interesting empirical support to the Bhaskar-To model. 
Another class of models that produces monopsony implications for small firms follows 
the general equilibrium search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998).  In the Burdett-
Mortensen model, market power accrues to employers because of search frictions. Currently 
employed workers constantly search for jobs.  As job offers arrive, an employee leaves his 
current employer if offered a higher wage.  An employer who offers a higher wage will lose 
fewer employees to higher-paying competitors and will have greater success in recruiting.  Thus 
a higher wage will yield a larger work force.   
Regardless of the source of the market power, in any dynamic monopsony model, 
equilibrium implies that the flow of recruits to the firm must balance the flow of those who leave. 
Thus if the size of the firm at time t is defined in terms of labor units t N , with a separation rate of 
( ) t s w and a recruitment function  ( ) t R w both depending on the wage, the firm’s size in the next 
period will be: 
￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, 
It follows that in a steady state,  
      ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿,  or 
(1)  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿, 
which can be interpreted as the long-run labor supply function to the firm, since it is based on a   6
steady-state equilibrium.  In elasticity terms, this dynamic labor supply function can be written 
as: 
(2)   ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿. 
This provides a basic framework from which the elasticity of labor supply to the firm 
might be estimated.  However, as Manning (2003, p. 97) points out, estimating the elasticity of 
recruits with respect to the wage is conceptually difficult.  The Burdett-Mortensen-Manning 
model provides a powerful insight into the relationship between the recruitment and separation 
elasticities.  In that model, the recruit to one firm is the separation from another.
1  The number of 
recruits that a firm might gain by increasing its offered wage is exactly the same magnitude as 
the number of quits that would be deterred.  Thus, the recruitment elasticity is simply the 
negative of the separation elasticity. [See Manning (2003, p. 97) for a formal derivation of the 
result.] Therefore, the elasticity of labor supply to the firm can be written as: 
(3)   ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿￿. 
This result makes it possible to estimate the firm’s labor supply elasticity only from information 
on the firm’s separations, conceptually a straightforward task if the necessary data are available. 
Strictly, the simplification expressed in equation (3) derives from a very stylized model 
of the labor market.  Many of the predictions of the Burdett-Mortensen model are clearly 
inconsistent with known facts about the labor market, as Kuhn (2004) points out in his thoughtful 
critique.    
While we recognize such criticism, we believe that there is at least intuitive support for 
estimating the labor supply elasticity to the firm by equation (3).  Essentially, our approach relies 
on two crucial results, both of which we argue are likely to hold outside the strict Burdett-
                                                 
1 Actually, the firm may also hire unemployed workers, but in the Burdett-Mortensen model, unemployed workers 
will accept any wage offered, so increasing the wage does not increase the number recruited from unemployment.   7
Mortensen framework. The first is that dynamic labor supply to the firm may be upward sloping, 
a result consistent with much more general versions of the search model, such as Mortensen 
(2003) or Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999), as well as alternative models of 
monopsony such as Bhaskar and To (1999).  
The second essential result is that recruitment and separation elasticities are equal in 
absolute value. The insight that one firm’s quit is another firm’s recruit has strong intuitive 
appeal.  Those who quit must (usually) end up working for another employer who provides a 
better job.  It is hard to imagine how the size of one employer’s gain from offering a higher wage 
can be much different than the size of the loss suffered by another because it offers a lower 
wage.  However, like many steady state results, the equality between recruitment and separation 
elasticities might be better viewed as an approximation.  
 
III. Data 
  The analysis makes use of data from several sources.  The data about individual school 
teachers as well as some district characteristics comes from the Missouri Department of 
Elementary and Secondary Education (MSDESE) census of teachers.  For the 1988-89 and 1989-
90 school years this provides the actual salary, fraction of time employed (full-time equivalent), 
years total teaching experience, years seniority in current district, and highest educational degree 
held, along with a unique identification number for each teacher. 
  Most school districts in Missouri have established a salary “schedule” — a guideline that 
defines the salary in terms of the teacher’s highest degree and seniority, and in some cases, 
teaching experience in other districts.  Each year the Missouri State Teachers Association 
(MSTA) surveys districts in the state and collects salary schedules from those that respond to   8
their survey.  From this survey we obtain the salary point for a teacher with a bachelors degree 
and no experience, referenced hereafter as the “base salary” and calculate the average pay 
increase from moving up one step on the schedule (the salary increase that results from one 
additional year of seniority), which we refer to as the “salary slope.”    Not all districts respond to 
the MSTA survey, and not all districts that do respond have a salary schedule in place, but most 
districts (451 of 540) provided base salary information for the 1988-89 year (which will be the 
primary focus of this analysis) and all but 13 of those provide enough information to calculate a 
slope measuring expected salary increases.  Additional characteristics of Missouri school 
districts such as student averages for race, ethnicity, IEP (special education) status, and free 
lunch eligibility as well as per pupil spending data for the 1989-1990 school year come from the 
National Center of Education Statistics Core of Common Data. 
  The final source for data is the 1990 Decennial Census of the United States from which 
we have obtained variables that measure the urban status and economic characteristics of 
residents who live within the district.  These variables include the percentage of the population of 
a school district that lives in a rural area, population density, and the median household income 
in each district.  These data have been aggregated from census geographical units to match the 
school district boundaries by the Office of Social and Education Data Analysis of the Missouri 
State Census Data Center. 
  There were a total of 49,874 teachers in the MSDESE data for the 1988-89 school year, 
of which 177 had a full-time equivalent of zero or missing.  Of the remaining 49,697, there were 
340 teachers working at less that 50 percent FTE, and these have been excluded from the sample.  
(This number represents less than 0.7 percent of the sample.)  Table 1 summarizes this 
individual-level data.     9
  A “separation” occurs if a teacher who was present in the 1988-89 school year is not 
present in the 1989-90 school year, or if the teacher works for a different district in the latter 
year.  The overall separation rate is just less than 10 percent.  Average full-time-equivalent salary 
is $25,856 for 1988, though the data indicate a range from $505 to $91,692.  Both these extremes 
are likely the result of some sort of clerical error as there are only twenty-three recorded salaries 
below $5,000 and one above $65,000.  The following analysis includes all observations but 
results are not sensitive to omitting these twenty-four outliers. 
  Slightly more than 50 percent of all teachers work for districts located in the St. Louis or 
Kansas City metropolitan areas.  The average teacher teaches in a district that contains about 
10,000 students, although the number of students in a district ranges in value from 14 to 46,128 
and is highly skewed in distribution. 
  Table 2 presents the district aggregate data.  Column (1) considers all districts in the 
sample. The separation rate for the average district is about 14 percent.  This reflects the 
skewness of the size of school districts.  Smaller districts tend to have higher separation rates, 
and most districts are small.  Similar patterns are also visible in other variables, such as the 
number of pupils in the district, or the metropolitan area dummies.  The average district has only 
about 1,500 students, while the average teacher is employed by a district that has about 10,000 
students!  All of these results reflect the fact that the majority of the districts in the state are small 
and rural, while there are a few very large districts.  Column (2) considers the subsample of 
districts for which base salary data is available. A comparison of the columns does not reveal any 
striking (or indeed statistically significant) differences in most characteristics, but it shows a 
number of small differences consistent with the fact that the smallest school districts, those with 
less than 25 teachers, are less likely to have a salary schedule.     10
  Figure 1 displays the geographical boundaries of school districts in Missouri and shows 
the relative size in terms of number of students enrolled.  The map also outlines the boundaries 
of the six Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in Missouri.  It is clear from the map that 
almost all districts in Missouri are quite small.  The few large districts are typically located in the 
principal cities of MSAs.  Even the largest metropolitan areas of the state contain some small 
school districts. 
  Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of base salaries across school districts.  
The blank areas represent districts for which we do not have a base salary.  There is no obvious 
geographical pattern of missing data.  Darker shading indicates higher salaries.  Although 
districts within the Kansas City and St. Louis metro areas appear to have higher salaries, it is also 
apparent that there is a fairly large amount of geographical variation in base salaries, even in 
areas of the state that are clearly rural in nature. 
 
IV.  Estimation Strategy 
A. Background 
  The task at hand, essentially, is to estimate the elasticity of separations with respect to the 
wage.  There is already a large literature in labor economics that examines separations.  Much of 
this literature concentrates on the relationship between demographic characteristics and the 
likelihood of quitting or being laid off, and although these issues are related to this study, they 
are not particularly relevant to the analysis.  This literature is surveyed, for example, in Farber 
(1999).  
  More germane are a number of studies that examine the sensitivity of quits to wages, 
such as Pencavel (1972), and Parsons (1973).  In fact the Pencavel model has some search-  11
theoretic elements, including the “monopsonistic” idea that the firm can influence the turnover 
rate by choosing a high or low wages.  However, most of this literature focuses on the question 
of specific human capital, since turnover is particularly costly for firms and workers in industries 
where there is a large amount of specific training.  District or school specific human capital is 
probably relatively unimportant in the market for public school teachers, as states set the 
curriculum, and what an instructor teaches in one school she could just as well teach in another.   
  Although these previous papers do not address the issue of the labor supply to the firm 
directly, a few recent studies that apply a similar approach to estimate labor supply to the firm.  
Manning’s (2003) book contains extensive empirical analyses, some of which are comparable to 
the analysis presented here.  Ransom and Oaxaca (2008) and Hirsch, et. al. (2008) estimate 
models that are similar to ours in order to explain differences in pay between men and women.  
 
B. Identification Strategy 
  The primary obstacle to estimating a separation elasticity and hence an elasticity of labor 
supply to the firm is likely to be an identification issue. To see this, consider estimating a 
regression of a dichotomous indicator for teacher separations on the natural logarithm of teacher 
salary with the goal of converting the parameter estimate into separation elasticity (through 
dividing by the average separation rate) as in the following equation: 
, , , (4) ln i d i d i d S W α β ε = + + ,  
where i indexes teacher and d district.   
The variation in observed wages is likely attributable to a number of factors including 
teacher attributes, union rules, district attributes, district desire for a certain workforce size (as 
suggested in our model), and even errors in measuring true salary levels.  As a result, the   12
estimate of β produced by this regression is unlikely to capture the true relationship insofar as 
many of these unobservable correlates of teacher salary also affect separation rates.  
In particular we are concerned that teachers may possess unobservable attributes that lead 
to both differential salaries and different separation rates.  Indeed prior research suggests that 
teacher attributes beyond experience and possession of an advanced degree are correlated with 
their pay levels (Figlio 1997; Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994) as well as with separation rates 
(Murnane and Olsen 1989, 1990). Though we will run our regressions at a district level, these 
characteristics are unlikely to be randomly distributed across schools or districts (Lankford, Loeb 
and Wyckoff 2002). Also, these characteristics do not necessarily have to be productive in the 
sense of improving student learning. For example, certain types of teacher personalities may be 
perceived as more accommodating to administrators which may result in higher salaries as well 
as greater stability of employment.
 2   
Fortunately, our data allow us to address this potential problem through the use of an 
instrumental variables strategy with the district base salary and the average slope of its salary 
increments from the salary schedule as instruments for actual salary. Since both base salaries and 
salary increments are directly correlated with actual salary, and unlikely correlated with the 
characteristics of teachers they may provide an identification to estimate the separation elasticity. 
Such instrumental variables estimates also account for the potential attenuation bias due to errors 
in measuring actual salary.  
However, even with this instrumental variables strategy, there are still remaining threats 
to identification, most particularly from unobservable district characteristics. To illustrate this, 
                                                 
2 Beyond this simple consideration, the salary of a particular individual may also represent some match-specific 
rents.  This raises complicated issues that are beyond the scope of this paper, but are discussed, for example, in 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987).     13
consider a more generalized regression model: 
(5) ln ln ln d
d d d d d d d
d
W S X W C X C β γ ε α β β γ ε   = + + = + − + +  
 
,   
where  d S and ln d W remain as previously defined, while Cd is a district level cost of living index 
and Xd is a vector including other district characteristics that may affect teacher salaries.  In this 
formulation, the firm’s elasticity of separations with respect to the wage may be calculated as 
β/Sd.  An “average” elasticity is  S β , where S  is the sample mean separation rate.  Although 
the model does suggest the possibility of identifying different elasticities for teachers or districts 
with particular characteristics, we initially confine our interest to estimating the average 
elasticity. 
  Equation (4) shows that a cost index is necessary because salary differentials likely 
reflect, in part, the higher cost of living in some areas. Furthermore, it is possible that our 
instruments, especially the base salary, preserve this variation due to cost of living, meaning our 
IV specification will fail to consistently estimate β without further controls. Although exact 
differences in the cost of living depend on the teachers’ housing locations, we will assume that 
housing locations are closely proxied by job location. Thus, we include the census estimated 
median household income of the school district in our regressions to control for the salary 
differential due to locational factors.  Recognizing the limited nature of any single cost index we 
also include a population density index for the district and the fraction of the district’s residents 
who live in “rural” areas, since some who live in MSAs actually live in the rural parts of 
counties.  (MSA boundaries follow the boundaries of counties, not necessarily the boundaries of 
the urbanized area of the city.)    
  Urban economic models of location choice, such as the “open city” model in Mills and 
Hamilton (1989, p. 115), explain differences in wages across geographical areas as compensating   14
differences for the higher cost of housing and/or the longer commutes required of those who live 
in larger cities.  Since in locational equilibrium the cost of living is the same for everyone living 
in the same city, and because all of those living outside of metropolitan areas experience roughly 
the same cost of living, these models suggest another candidate index for the geographical 
variation in cost of living can be captured with a set of dummy variables that identify the major 
cities of the state.  In this spirit we also present regressions with dummy variable controls for 
census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) of the state (an approximation to these “cities.”).  
Our results indicate that using either or both methods of accounting for cost of living differences 
produces similar estimates of the labor supply elasticity. 
  Beyond the cost of living issues there are other potential district characteristic pitfalls. 
For example Hanushek, Rivkin, and Kain (2004) show that teacher separations depend on the 
race and socioeconomic characteristics of the students in the district. If there is some sort of 
bonus “combat pay” attached to districts with those characteristics this would represent another 
potential source of bias. Consequently we will control for student characteristics in all of our 
regression estimates. 
  Though we are concerned about the potential effects of both unobservable teacher and 
district characteristics on the identification of our estimates, there is less cause for concern about 
union influence.  Teachers’ unions in Missouri are prohibited by state law from formal collective 
bargaining.  The law requires districts to “meet and confer” with teachers or their representatives.  
This means that “bargaining” takes place at the discretion of the local school district.  Teachers 
are legally proscribed from striking and cannot enter into a binding collective bargaining contract 
with local school districts.  Nevertheless, a more-or-less formal bargaining process does take   15
place in the large St. Louis and Kansas City districts.
3   While it is possible that teachers’ unions 
exert some influence in the salary determination process this is unlikely a source of much salary 
variation as we will show that excluding urban districts will not change our estimates.  Even if 
unions had a strong role in setting base salaries, our estimates would still be interpretable as the 
labor supply elasticity to the firm, regardless of districts’ inability to exercise the full implied 
monopsony power. 
  As our theory suggests that districts set wages to achieve a certain size (in employees) in 
steady state, an ideal instrument would encapsulate that part of teacher salary that reflects the 
predetermined wage setting policy of an employer.  While the variation in base salary may also 
reflect cost of living and working conditions considerations, we believe we can successfully 
control for these undesirable sources of variation.  Given a successful control strategy, the 
remaining variation in base salary is likely to be due to differential district level demand for 
teachers, exactly what we require to identify a supply parameter. Estimation then proceeds via 
two-stage least squares on equation (5) with the natural logarithm of a district’s base salary as the 
excluded instrument.  The elimination of bias due to unmeasured teacher characteristics and 
measurement error should lead to substantial improvements over the OLS estimates that could be 
produced using standard national data sources. 
  While the base salary instrument captures level differences between district compensation 
policies, the average slope of their schedule captures differences in trajectory. Nevertheless, the 
variation in the salary slope instrument is likely to come from similar sources as the base 
instrument--some combination of cross district variation in demand for retaining experienced 
teachers and a set of district characteristics that affect the teachers’ willingness to supply labor.  
                                                 
3This information is based on a discussion with Professor Michael Podgursky, professor of economics at the 
University of Missouri.   16
If we can control for the latter source of variation we can also expect the salary slope instrument 
to yield consistent estimates, though the teachers for whom it induces variation might not be 
representative of Missouri teachers as a whole. 
 
V.  Results 
A.  Estimation 
As we will be using district level variation in salary schedule instruments to identify our 
separation elasticity, working with district level observations seems sensible. However, we still 
wish to account for the fact that observable teacher level characteristics such as experience are 
likely to have an important role in explaining separations and salary levels. Consequently we 
begin by estimating: 
, , , (6) i d i d d i d S X α λ δ η = + + +  
via a linear probability model.  Si,d is a dummy variable equal to one if the teacher leaves his or 
her district after the 1988-89 school year, Xi,d is a vector of teacher characteristics including 
experience, time with current employer, sex, and education level, and δd is a district fixed effect.  
We then form district average residuals from this regression,  d S
)
for each district.  We use a 
similar methodology to produce a district level regression adjusted log salary residual, ln d W
)
. 
Regression coefficients for these models are reported in Table A1.  
  The regression adjustment allows us to easily see the relationship between salariesln d W
)
 
and separations  d S
)
at a district level, presented as Figure 3. Note that the separation rate is 
declining with increases in salary as expected, although the slope does not appear particularly 
steep.  Also, it appears that several districts had very few separations during this year, and that   17
one of the districts experienced a full turnover of 100 percent of their teachers.  (That district had 
only 30 students and 3 teachers in 1988).   
  Figure 4 illustrates the positive bivariate first-stage relationship between log base salary 
and our district regression adjusted average salary, ln d W
)
. It also suggests that the positive 
relationship between base and actual salary is not confined to large districts. Table 3 provides the 
regression estimates of the first stage relationship, and shows a strong positive correlation 
between both potential instruments and actual salaries. This relationship persists with the 
addition of numerous control covariates including SMSA fixed effects. The F-statistic on the null 
hypothesis that the two instruments jointly have zero effect the first stage is close to 60 in all 
cases suggesting that the analysis is unlikely to suffer from weak instrument issues. Also the 
instruments and included controls do a good job of explaining cross district salary differences,  
with a coefficient of variation of 0.90 in one specification.  
  As a benchmark, Columns (1) – (3) of Table 4 present OLS estimates of the elasticity of 
separations from equation (5), along with the implied elasticity of the labor supply curve to 
Missouri school districts. Column (1) includes controls designed to capture differences in the 
cost of living across districts. The estimates here suggest that it would require almost a 10% 
increase in average teacher salary to reduce separations by a single percentage point. These 
coefficient estimates are robust to the addition of other district characteristics in column (2) and 
the addition of MSA fixed effects in column (3).
4   
  Because of the lack of sensitivity of separations to wage changes, these OLS estimates 
generate a low implied elasticity of labor supply to the firm, around 1.6.  If true, these estimates 
                                                 
4 The use of a Probit model produces similar estimated marginal effects of log salary on separations, so we do not 
believe that model linearity is important in our results.   18
suggest that Missouri school districts have a great deal power to set wages.  A standard measure 
of monopsony power is Pigouvian “exploitation:” 








= = .   
 (See Boal and Ransom, 1997, p. 87 for a discussion.)   A profit-maximizing monopsonist facing 
a labor supply elasticity of less than two would pay a wage less than half of the marginal value of 
output!  Of course, in the context of equilibrium search models, the comparison is not quite so 
straightforward, as the monopsony power arises from imperfect information and other frictions 
in the labor market, and it is likely that labor market institutions, such as unions, may limit the 
exercise of this power.  Nevertheless, this is an extremely low elasticity of labor supply to the 
firm.  The OLS estimates here are robust to the choice of covariates.  Additional robustness 
checks not reported in the table find that the only specification that results in estimated 
elasticities that are much greater in magnitude is one that eliminates all cost of living controls 
(including SMSA fixed effects) from the regression. 
  In order to provide estimates that will be directly comparable to the instrumental variable 
regressions, columns (4) – (6) repeat the previous analysis using only those districts that have 
base salary data available. Figure 2 shows the districts for which the base salary data is not 
available, most notably the St. Louis school district, the largest in the state. The effect of salary 
on separations is not much different from the OLS coefficient obtained from the whole sample, 
so the IV results discussed below are not driven by selecting a particular composition of districts. 
As further least squares estimates using the 438 districts for which both instruments are available 
differ only marginally from those shown in columns (4) – (6) we do not report the coefficients.  
  These instrumental variables estimates are presented in Table 5 whose columns contain 
specifications whose control variables match those of the corresponding column numbers in the   19
preceding table. The first three columns use the base salary from the salary schedule as the 
excluded instrument.  Here, the estimated coefficient on salary is much larger than that estimated 
by OLS--only a 4-5 percent salary increase would be required to produce a one percentage point 
decrease in separation rates. This is likely due to bias in the OLS estimates from some 
combination of omitted variables and measurement error.  These results in turn imply a much 
higher elasticity of labor supply to the firm, though the implied elasticity is still only about 3.7. 
Furthermore, the parameter on which the elasticity estimate is based is estimated with relatively 
high precision, and it is evident that the elasticity of labor supply to the firm is much smaller than 
the infinity of the perfectly competitive model. Interestingly, the Pigou’s E for this estimate is 
still around 27 percent, which seems rather large.  These results indicate that Missouri school 
districts have a meaningful level of market power. The IV results are also quite robust to changes 
in included covariates.  
  Columns (4) – (6) of Table 5 use both the base level and average slope of the salary 
schedule as dual excluded instruments. Although this does lower the standard errors on the log 
salary coefficient, it does not substantially change the coefficient estimates, which continue to 
imply a labor supply elasticity to the firm in the range of 3.6 - 3.7 when district level controls are 
fully considered.  This might be taken as evidence that the salary scale is set in a consistent 
manner to consider both new hiring and retention. 
Though the primary identifying assumption of the instrumental variables model, the 
excludability of base salary from the reduced form regression, is not directly testable there are a 
couple of plausible theories that might lead us to question it. Both revolve around differences 
between rural and urban school districts. In the first, urban school districts might provide higher 
salaries in an attempt to compensate for poor working conditions not captured by our included   20
controls, yet still suffer higher separation rates due to these conditions. Alternatively, the higher 
salaries and quit rates might reflect cost of living differences or other factors inherent to cities. 
Even if the exclusion restriction holds, urban and rural districts might pick equilibrium points 
with different labor supply elasticities.  
  Table 6 investigates the possible divergence of urban and rural supply elasticities by 
examining different cuts of the data. Using two stage least squares regressions following the 
middle specification of the previous table, column (2) contrasts a sample omitting all districts in 
the Kansas City and St. Louis MSAs with the whole base salary sample results reported in 
column (1). Since those are the most urbanized areas and represent more than half of the teachers 
in Missouri, it is perhaps surprising to see a statistically insignificant change of less than 0.02 in 
the estimated coefficient. Further examination of labor supply to rural districts also shows few 
changes. Column (3) excludes from the sample all districts in metropolitan areas and column (4) 
looks only at districts with entirely rural populations.  These specifications demonstrate that there 
are few differences in labor supply elasticity to school districts in Missouri that arise from urban-
rural differences, once we condition on included control variables. Indeed the implied labor 
supply elasticites remain in a 2.98 to 3.80 range around our baseline estimate of 3.57. 
 
B. Discussion 
  Is the estimated labor supply elasticity to firms too low to be plausibly believed?  Is the 
number really an indication of a shortcoming in the applicability of a monopsony model to the 
teacher labor market? While both of those conclusions are possible, there are some institutional 
features of the labor market for teachers that suggest that a high degree of district market power 
is plausible.   21
  First, there is the Boyd et. al. (2005) evidence on the strong locational preferences of 
teachers.  They show that teacher have strong preference to work in geographical areas near the 
high school they attended.  In their study of teachers in the state of New York, they found that 
new teachers were four times more likely to accept a teaching position within five miles of their 
hometown than one more than forty miles away. A second fact that is consistent with district 
market power is that a substantial fraction of teachers are also second earners within their 
families which may limit their mobility. An analysis of the 1990 PUMS census data (Ruggles et 
al. 2004) reveals that almost two-thirds of Missouri school teachers in 1990 were born in 
Missouri, a fact consistent with strong locational preferences of teachers.  If the sample is further 
restricted to exclude the teachers in the large cities of St. Louis and Kansas City the Missouri 
natality of teachers is 20 percentage points higher.  
  A strong preference for employment in a small geographical area is certainly a potential 
factor in low responsiveness of quit rates to salary differentials.  A further barrier to movement 
between districts is the nature of salary schedules for Missouri school districts.  Salary level is 
typically determined by years of seniority with the particular district (along with education 
level).  While some districts may grant full credit for teaching experience in another district, the 
most common practice is to credit no more than five years of teaching experience toward 
seniority steps.  Thus, a teacher with ten years experience in district A might suffer a substantial 
pay cut if he were to move to district B.
5 
Another possible source of market power is the nature of teacher pensions.  Many school 
districts, including those in Missouri in the late 1980’s, offer defined benefit pension plans that 
vest after some term of employment (5 years for almost all Missouri districts).  However, these 
                                                 
5 Of course, a teacher with high levels of experience at a very low pay district might  receive a higher salary at a 
high pay district, even with the incomplete experience credit.   22
pensions accrue in a highly non-linear way based on years of experience and age.  Simulations in 
Podgursky and Ehlert (2007) show that pension wealth for Missouri teachers accumulates very 
rapidly during certain years of a teacher’s career (sometimes exceeding annual salary in present 
value), and this situation would clearly deter moving to another employer that did not share the 
same pension plan.  On the other hand, with the exceptions of the large districts of St. Louis and 
Kansas City that operate their own separate pension plans,
6 all public school teachers in Missouri 
belong to the same pension plan.  However, any salary penalty due to incomplete credit for 
teaching experience could be magnified by the pension system, even for movements between 
employers within the system, since benefits are based on some measure of average salary.  Thus, 
changing to a different employer could induce a significant financial loss to a Missouri 
schoolteacher.  
  If pension lock or incomplete credit for experience plays a role in the low responsiveness 
of teachers to salary differentials, the responsiveness should vary by teacher experience.  Table 
7, which examines supply elasticity heterogeneity across a few teacher characteristics, provides 
evidence that this is indeed the case. Since the table is designed to explore differences due to 
individual teacher characteristics, it represents the results of a series of individual level two-stage 
least squares regressions of a separation dummy on the teacher’s actual salary as well as personal 
and district characteristics. The base salary and salary slope are used as excluded instruments. 
This methodology differs somewhat from our baseline which looks at adjusted district averages 
and produces slightly smaller average coefficients for the whole sample. However, the 
coefficient estimates together with specific separation rates for teachers with a particular 
characteristic allow us to produce supply elasticity estimates that may be comparable in a relative 
sense across groups.  
                                                 
6 Podgursky and Ehlert (2007, p.2).   23
  The first panel of the table shows that teachers with less than ten years of tenure in a 
district are four times more sensitive to wage differences than their colleagues with between ten 
and twenty years of tenure. The disparity of results is somewhat smaller when overall experience 
is considered suggesting that the tenure with the current district is likely the driving force behind 
this effect rather than age or general experience. To further emphasize this point, panel C shows 
that there are comparatively small differences in responsiveness between teachers with different 
degree levels, conditional on experience. 
  Panel D of Table 7 looks at differences in wage responsiveness by teacher sex. It finds 
that male teachers are approximately fifty percent more responsive to wage changes in terms of 
separations.  In our data sample we find that men teaching in Missouri school districts are paid 
slightly more than a six percent premium relative to women with equivalent experience and 
education (see Table A1).  Manning (2003) and more recently Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel 
(2008) suggest that some of the observed pay differential between men and women may be due 
to different labor supply elasticities to the employer. Ransom and Oaxacca (2008) show that the 
equality of marginal costs across inputs for profit maximizing firms implies a direct relationship 
between the log wage gender gap and differing labor supply elasticities to a firm: 
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. 
While it is possible that school districts are not equating marginal costs across various 
groups of teachers, if we proceed with the assumption that this approximates their behavior, the 
gender supply elasticites of Table 7 suggest we should expect to see a log wage gap of eight 
percent favoring men in the Missouri teacher labor market, remarkably close to actual six percent 
gap.  Thus, employer monopsony power provides a plausible explanation for the magnitude of 
the observed gender wage differential for public school teachers in Missouri.   24
 
VI.  Conclusions 
  Newer models of many-firm monopsony help motivate the notion that the dynamic 
movement of labor markets may not be frictionless.  This framework provides a potential new 
approach for estimating the elasticity of labor supply to the firm.  In this paper we estimate the 
labor supply elasticity to public school districts in Missouri.  Because of the likely presence of 
measurement error and bias due to unmeasured teacher characteristics, we adopt an instrumental 
variables strategy using published salary schedules of the districts to create instruments. 
Although the IV and OLS results are quite different, both indicate that the process by which 
teachers and districts are matched results in a substantial amount of wage-setting power for 
school districts. 
  In fact, our instrumental variables estimates imply a labor supply elasticity to the firm of 
about 3.7.  This suggests that labor market frictions give employers enough power to reduce 
wages somewhere in the neighborhood of 27 percent when compared with a world of perfectly 
informed and mobile workers, in the absence of institutions or factors that might limit a district’s 
ability to exercise its monopsony power. Our results also support the idea that certain 
institutional features of the teacher labor market, such as existing pension plans, serve to limit 
the mobility of teachers. Furthermore, our estimates suggest that the wage disparity between 
male and female teachers in Missouri can be explained by differing elasticities to the firm.   
  This research shows that in one well-defined labor market, that of school teachers in 
Missouri, employers enjoy a substantial amount of monopsony power in spite of the presence of 
many competitors.  Further research is needed to understand how these results apply to firms 
more generally.   25
References 
Beck, Paul M. (1993).  “Monopsony in the Market for Public School Teachers in Missouri:  The 
Static and Dynamic Impact on Salaries and Employment.”  Ph. D. Dissertation, U. of 
Missouri. 
 
Bhaskar, V. and Ted To. (1999). “Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A 
Theory of Monopsonistic Competition.” The Economic Journal 109, 190-203. 
 
Boal, William M. and Michael R Ransom. (1997) “Monopsony in the Labor Market,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 35, 86-112. 
 
Bontemps, Christian, Jean-Marc Robin, and Gerard J. Van den Berg. (1999). “An Empirical 
Equilibrium Job Search Model with Search on the Job and Heterogeneous Workers and 
Firms,” International Economic Review, 40(4), 1043-1074. 
 
Boyd, Donald, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb and James Wyckoff. (2005) “The Draw of 
  Home: How Teachers’ Preferences for Proximity Disadvantage Urban Schools.” Journal 
  of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(1), 113–132.  
 
Burdett, Kenneth and Dale T. Mortensen.  (1998) “Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and 
Unemployment,” International Economic Review, 39(2), 257-73. 
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Dominic J. Brewer. (1994). “Do school and teacher characteristics 
matter? Evidence from High School and Beyond.” Economics of Education Review 13 
(1), 1-17. 
 
Farber, Henry S.  (1999) “Mobility and Stability:  The Dynamics of Job Change in Labor 
Markets,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3B,  ed. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card 
2567-2627.  Amsterdam:  North Holland. 
 
Figlio, David N. (1997). “Teacher salaries and teacher quality.” Economics Letters 55, 267-271. 
 
Hirsch, Boris, Thorsten Schank, and Claus Schnabel. (2008) . Differences in Labor Suply to 
Monopsonistic Firms and the Gender Pay Gap: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked 
Employer-Employee Data from Germany. Princeton Industrial Relations Section Working 
Paper #541. 
 
Kuhn, Peter. (2004) “Is Monopsony the Right Way to Model Labor Markets? A Review of Alan 
Manning’s Monopsony in Motion,” International Journal of the Economics of Business, 
11(3), 369-378. 
 
Lankford, Hamilton, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. (2002). Teacher Sorting and the Plight 
of Urban Schools: A Descriptive Analysis. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 
24 (1), 37-62. 
 
Manning, Alan.  (2003) Monopsony in Motion.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mortensen, Dale T. (2003) “How Monopsonistic is the (Danish) Labor Market,” in Knowledge, 
Information and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics, edited by Phillipe Aghion,   26
Roman Frydman, Joseph Stiglitz and Michael Woodford, pp. 286-308, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Murnane, Richard J., and Randall J. Olsen. (1990). "The Effects of Salaries and Opportunity 
Costs on Length of Stay in Teaching: Evidence from North Carolina." Journal of Human 
Resources 25, 106-24.  
Murnane, Richard J., and Randall J. Olsen. (1989). "The Effects of Salaries and Opportunity 
Costs on Duration in Teaching: Evidence from Michigan." Review of Economics and 
Statistics 71, 347-52.  
Parsons, Donald O.  (1972)  “Specific Human Capital:  An Application to Quit Rates and Layoff 
Rates,” Journal of Political Economy, 80 (6), 1120-43. 
 
Pencavel, John.  (1972)  “Wages, Specific Training, and Labor Turnover in U. S. Manufacturing 
Industries,” International Economic Review, 13(1), 53-64. 
 
Podgursky, Michael and Mark Ehlert, (2007) “Teacher Pensions and Retirement Behavior:  How 
Teacher Pension Rules Affect Behavior, Mobility, and Retirement,” National Center for 
Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research, Working Paper #5. 
 
Ransom, Michael R. and Ronald L. Oaxaca.  (2008)  “New Market Power Models and Sex 
Differences in Pay,” Princeton Industrial Relations Section Working Paper #541 
 
Robinson, Joan. (1969) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 2nd Edition, London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Ruggles, Steven, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia 
Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander.  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: 
Version 3.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population 
Center [producer and distributor], 2004. 
 
Staiger, Douglas, Joanne Spetz and Ciaran Phibbs (2008) "Is There Monopsony in the Labor 
Market? Evidence From a Natural Experiment," Princeton Industrial Relations Section 
Working Paper #540. 
 
 
     27
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Individual Teachers 
Variable  Mean 
(std dev.) 
































































        Joplin MSA  0.028 
(0.165) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – District Averages 
Variable  All districts    Base Salary Districts 





  0.136 
(0.098) 




  16,141.76 
(1,966.18) 




  322.78 
(176.47) 




  21,627 
(3,926) 




  9.958 
(0.160) 




  1,599 
(3,113) 
        Number of Teachers  91.419 
(227.009) 
  96.8 
(189.7) 
        District Population Density  0.257 
(0.912) 
  0.288 
(0.937) 
        District Fraction Rural  0.796 
(0.337) 
  0.763 
(0.352) 
        Log of Median HH Income  9.964 
(0.278) 
  9.977 
(0.281) 
        Fraction Free Lunch Eligible  0.285 
(0.156) 
  0.273 
(0.152) 
        Fraction IEP  0.122 
(0.054) 
  0.119 
(0.048) 
        Fraction Black Students  0.039 
(0.114) 
  0.043 
(0.118) 
        Fraction Hispanic Students  0.003 
(0.009) 
  0.003 
(0.007) 
        Per-Pupil Expenditures  4,242.370 
(1,120.514) 
  4,134.634 
(1,046.272) 




  0.093 
(0.291) 




  0.118 
(0.322) 




  0.016 
(0.124) 




  0.033 
(0.180) 





  0.024 
(0.154) 




  0.011 
(0.105) 
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Table 3: First stage estimates of the total and base salary relationship.   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
A.  Instruments         












          Joint F-statistic for instruments = 0       57.10  59.39 
          B.  Other Controls         
































































          Kansas City SMSA    0.039 
(0.012)** 
  0.045 
(0.013)** 
          St. Louis SMSA    0.058 
(0.016)** 
  0.032 
(0.014)* 
          St. Joseph SMSA    0.012 
(0.013) 
  0.032 
(0.018) 
          Springfield SMSA    0.029 
(0.017) 
  0.013 
(0.012) 
          Joplin SMSA    -0.012 
(0.016) 
  -0.019 
(0.010) 
          Columbia SMSA    0.046 
(0.025) 
  0.066 
(0.020)** 
          R-squared  0.78  0.88  0.89  0.90 
n  451  451  438  438 
The dependent variable is district average of the natural logarithm of teacher salary. All 
regressions weighted by the number of teachers in the district. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.       31
Table 4: OLS Estimates of the Labor Supply Elasticity to Missouri School Districts 
  All districts    Districts with base salary data  
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 












                Implied Labor Supply ε  1.594  1.664  1.566    1.706  1.838  1.735 
               












































































                SMSA fe  No   No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.30  0.32  0.33    0.32  0.34  0.34 
n  540  540  540    451  451  451 
Dependent variable is a district separation rate which has been regression adjusted to reflect differences in individual level 
teacher characteristics. All regressions weighted by the number of FTE teachers in the district. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Joint F-tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the collective SMSA 
fixed effects equal zero.  32
Table 5: 2SLS Estimates of the Labor Supply Elasticity to Missouri School Districts 
Instruments  Natural Log of base salary    Natural Log of base salary, salary slope 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 












                Implied Labor Supply ε  3.103  3.574  3.691    3.424  3.667  3.758 
               




































































                Per-Pupil Expenditures 
(x1000) 








                SMSA fe  No  No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.31  0.32  0.32    0.30  0.32  0.32 
N  451  451  451    438  438  438 
Dependent variable is the district separation rate. All regressions weighted by the number of FTE teachers in the district. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities are figured using the relevant separation rate for that sample 0.136 for columns (1)-(3) and 
0.132 for columns (4)-(6). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
   33
Table 6: Labor Supply Elasticity – rural specification checks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








         
Average separation rate  0.136  0.150  0.155  0.167 
         
Implied Labor Supply ε  3.574  3.013  2.981  3.796 
         
Sample   baseline  no KC or  
StL MSA 
Non-metro  Totally rural 
N=  451  356  318  283 
 Dependent variable is the district separation rate. Regressions are analogous to Table 5, column (2). Robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses. Column (2) omits all districts within the St Louis and Kansas City MSA’s. 
Column (3) includes in the sample only districts outside metro areas and column (4) includes districts located 
entirely in rural areas. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  34
         
Table 7: Labor Supply elasticities by teacher characteristic 
     
A. Teacher Tenure with district     
                                   Less than 10 years  4.77   
                                   10 – 20 years  1.04   
     
B. Teacher Overall Experience     
                                   Less than 10 years  4.22   
                                   10 – 20 years  1.24   
     
C. Teacher Education     
                                   Bachelors only  3.44   
                                   Advanced degree  3.17   
     
D. Teacher Sex     
                                   Male  4.45   
                                   Female  3.02   
Each separation elasticity is computed using the results from an 
individual level regression (for those teachers with the indicated 
characteristic) of a separation dummy on the teachers log salary with 
salary schedule base and slope as instruments. Individual characteristic 
controls as well as the district level controls of Table 5 column (2) are 
included. A group specific elasticity can then be computed using that 
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Figure 3 
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Notes:  Size of the circle is proportional to the number of teachers in the district. Both variables 
are district averaged residuals from individual level regressions on teacher characteristics. 
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Figure 4 











































9.2  9.4 9.6 9.8 10 
Log District Base Salary   
Notes:  The size of the circle is proportional to the number of teachers in the district.  Adjusted 
District Average Log Salary represents district averaged residuals from individual level 
regressions on teacher characteristics. 
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Appendix Table A1: Individual determinants of teacher outcomes   
  Employment 
Separation 
Log Salary 
  (1)  (2) 
Teaching Experience  -0.011  0.020 
  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
Experience
2 (x100)  0.036  -0.037 
  (0.002)**  (0.001)** 
Tenure with District  -0.010  0.010 
  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
Tenure
2 (x 100)  0.025  -0.012 
  (0.003)**  (0.001)** 
Female  -0.015  -0.061 
  (0.003)**  (0.001)** 
MA Degree  0.017  0.116 
  (0.003)**  (0.001)** 
Specialist Degree  0.019  0.137 
  (0.011)  (0.004)** 
Doctoral Degree  0.050  0.193 
  (0.021)*  (0.008)** 
     
Number of district fe  540  540 
R-squared  0.03  0.64 
Standard errors in parentheses. N = 49,357.  All regressions also 
include district fixed effects.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%.     